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We examine evidence for a systematic underperformance of Germany’s state-owned banks in 
the current financial crisis and study if the bank losses can be traced to the quality of bank 
governance. For this purpose, we examine the biographical background of 593 supervisory 
board members in the 29 largest banks and find a pronounced difference in the finance and 
management experience of board representatives across private and state-owned banks. 
Measures of “boardroom competence” are then related directly to the magnitude of bank 
losses in the recent financial crisis. Our data confirms that supervisory board (in-)competence 
in finance is related to losses in the financial crisis. Improved bank governance is therefore a 
suitable policy objective to reduce bank fragility. 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. subprime crisis had a dramatic effect on the solvency of state-owned German banks. 
Four fully or partly state-owned banks had to be rescued at the expense of the tax payer: 
WestLB, IKB Deutsche Industriebank, Sachsen LB, and Bayern LB. In this context, Wolfgang 
Münchau, a leading business journalist, commented: 
“The more interesting point is whether it is accidental that all the German banks in 
trouble are essentially publicly owned. [...] The episode tells us, once again, that 
Germany has too many banks, and in fact, too many bankers. Most of the 
supervisory board members of these institutions are themselves financially 
illiterate and do not fully understand the ins and out of investments in new 
financial instruments, such as CDOs or CDS. They have failed to implement 
proper risk management systems - something which a private bank could ill 
afford.”
1 
The objective of our study is to examine both assertions, namely whether German state-owned 
banks indeed suffered disproportionally higher subprime-related losses than private banks and 
whether this could reflect differences in board competence between state-owned and private 
sector banks.  
The answers to these questions hold importance far beyond the specific context of German 
banking. Worldwide, a large proportion of bank assets are still effectively state-owned. 
Estimates by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) suggest that on average 42 
percent of the equity of the 10 largest banks in each country was state-owned in 1995. The 
German banking sector with its large share of state-owned banks is in some ways typical of the 
worldwide distribution of control rights in banks. State-ownership in Germany and elsewhere 
comes with a specific governance structure in which high-level state employees and politicians 
exercise the monitoring function otherwise played by private shareholders or their 
representatives. This raises some important questions: What is the quality of such bank 
supervision? Does public ownership come at the price of a deficient bank management 
control? The economic significance of this question far transcends the German economic 
context analyzed here. 
As a consequence of recent government sponsored bank recapitalization plans, state-ownership 
in banks is likely to experience a dramatic increase. Even countries like the U.S. and the U.K., 
where state-ownership in banks was never important, now feature a partially state-owned 
banking sector. Will the government seek the shareholder representation which comes with its 
ownership share and delegate treasury representatives and politicians to the respective bank 
boards? Again, a close look at the monitoring effectiveness of such state delegates seems 
warranted and the German experience offers an instructive case study. 
The banking crisis certainly led to financial distress also among many private banks. First, we 
do not claim that private ownership is a sufficient condition for a bank’s crisis resilience. 
Indeed, private bank institutions may also suffer from severe corporate governance problems. 
Their failure in risk control does not invalidate the hypothesis that bank governance matters. 
Second, equity owners generally do not have optimal incentives when it comes to risk choices. 
The corporate finance literature highlights that the option character of private equity may give 
the equity owners an incentive for excessive risk taking. In particular, equity owners profit 
                                                 
1The quote is taken from an article entitled “Another Landesbank bites the dust” on the website of 
Eurointelligence http://www.eurointelligence.com/Article3.1018+M50fcec22186.0.html.    3  
from a mean preserving increase in the dispersion of payoffs due to their limited liability. But 
short of actual bankruptcy, equity owners are certainly most exposed to any decrease in long-
run expected payoffs. Hence, any misalignment of social and shareholder objectives may well 
be a second order problem compared to the corporate governance problems related, for 
example, to badly designed compensation systems and/or a breakdown of management 
monitoring related to state-ownership. 
The recent financial crisis has revived the interest in issues of the stability of the banking 
sector. There is general agreement now – even by supervisors and standard setters themselves 
– that bank supervision was often too lenient and ineffective. But it is also worth recalling that 
such leniency may often have been the result of political lobbying of the financial industry 
itself. Last, but not least, the general extension of credit and leveraged finance served powerful 
political interests which are likely to persist in the future.
2 This raises the question as to 
whether tough banking regulation can withstand opportunistic political behavior in the long 
run. The political exposure of bank supervision then calls for a more general approach to 
banking stability which explores additional policy measures by which banking stability can be 
enhanced in the presence of imperfect bank supervision.
3 
One such policy dimension which we examine in this article is the role of bank governance. A 
closer look at the data reveals that there is high variance in bank performance during the crisis. 
What can we learn from these performance differences? Can they be explained by the quality 
of bank governance? The empirical study in this paper sheds some light on these questions. 
Five findings can be highlighted: 
1.  The 29 largest German banks show a systematic underperformance of state-owned 
banks in the recent banking crisis. Adjusted for size, asset write-downs and losses from 
the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2008 are on average three times as large 
for state-owned banks compared to privately owned banks. 
2.  A close examination of the biographical background of 593 supervisory board 
members in the largest German banks reveals that measures of management and 
financial experience of the board members are systematically higher in privately owned 
banks compared to state-owned banks. This difference in boardroom competence is 
statistically highly significant and qualitatively large. 
3.  Bank losses during the financial crisis correlate with the financial (in-)competence of 
supervisory boards. A lack of competent board monitoring is therefore our leading 
explanation for underperformance of state banks. A causal linkage between board 
competence and crisis performance is confirmed by using the exogenous number of  
politically appointed board members as a statistical instrument for financial board 
competence.   
4.  We find no evidence for other managerial constraints related to state ownership which 
can account for the underperformance of state banks. For example, executive 
compensation is only slightly lower (by 9.5 percent) compared to private banks.  
5.  Higher average executive board compensation is positively correlated with bank losses 
contrary to what can be expected in an efficient market for managerial pay. Investment 
                                                 
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) remark that the list of leading contributors to the presidential and congressional 
candidates in the U.S. election is dominated by financial companies. They conclude: ‘Thus it is no surprise that, 
during the boom, all the supposed market watchdogs were neutered. This is an international problem, not just a 
U.S. one.’ 
3 The most widely endorsed policy measure in this context is the transfer of interbank trading in the OTC markets 
to organized exchanges with centralized guaranteed clearing. This highly sensible measure is not the focus of the 
current article.     4  
in executive monitoring or/and selection appear to have a higher return than more 
generous pay packages.    
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the German 
banking system, reviews the historic performance of state-owned banks and examines their 
performance in the recent financial crisis relative to the privately owned banks. Different 
hypotheses about the role of governance and crisis performance are formulated in Section 3. 
Section 4 undertakes a detailed study of corporate governance quality across state-owned and 
private banks. Here we use biographical data on 593 supervisory board members to measure 
supervisory board competence and monitoring ability. Section 5 examines the linkage between 
board quality and a bank’s crisis performance. In Section 6, we explore alternative 
explanations for performance differences such as managerial constraints for state-owned banks 
and the role of executive pay in general. A summary with policy conclusions is provided in 
Section 7. 
2. The German Banking System and its Performance in the Subprime Crisis 
In this section, we briefly describe the basic features of the German banking system and 
discuss how it fared during the financial crisis. We argue that the coexistence of a private 
banking system and a state-owned system makes the German banking system an ideal 
laboratory to study the role of different governance systems for a bank’s crisis performance.  
2.1 An Overview of the German Banking Sector 
German banking is characterized by the coexistence of three types of banks – commercial 
banks, cooperatives and public sector banks.
4 
First, commercial banks are corporations and operate as universal banks. In terms of total 
assets, domestic commercial banks account for 28.6 percent of the German banking sector (see 
Figure 1). Commercial banks are privately owned and private shareholder representatives sit 
on their supervisory boards. The German banking statistics separately lists real estate banks 
which are also privately owned (with a few minor exceptions) and which account for another 
11.1 percent of the banking sector. 
Second, cooperative banks feature a different governance structure. The equity holders – 
usually customers of the cooperative banks – have equal voting rights independent of their 
equity shares. Traditionally, the 1,200 cooperative banks have a strong regional focus. To 
overcome the disadvantages of such a fragmented structure, the cooperative banks have 
founded two cooperative central banks (DZ Bank and WGZ Bank) which, among other things, 
carry out the investment banking for the individual and often small cooperative banks. Overall, 
the segment of cooperative banks has an asset share of 12 percent. 
Third, German banking also comprises a large state-owned or public banking sector. It can be 
further divided into two types of banks according to their geographical scope. The savings 
banks are organized locally or regionally. These banks are owned by their respective 
municipalities or counties.
5 The savings banks account for 13.8 percent of banking assets and 
typically do not engage in any international banking activities.
6 For this reason, we ignore 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive survey of the German banking system, see Brunner et al. (2004) and Krahnen and Schmidt 
(2004). 
5 Vins (2008) analyses the political influence on the state-owned savings banks in Germany. 
6 By law, the ‘regional principle’ constrains the activities of savings banks to their home regions. Hence, 
regulation rather than managerial choice partly determines the allocation of financial resources.     5  
these public sector institutions in our analysis. More important for our study are the 11 major 
publicly owned banks that operate nationwide and engage in international banking activities. 
Most of these banks belong to the so-called Landesbanken which were originally founded for 
providing development financing in their regions and for acting as central banking institutions 
for the local savings banks. Over time, however, the Landesbanken have developed into 
universal banks that engage in large-scale (international) lending in direct competition with the 
private banks. Their share of banking assets is 21 percent. In addition to the Landesbanken, 
there are several special purpose banks (among others, KfW and IKB
7) which are directly or 
indirectly owned by the federal or state governments (with a few minor exceptions). Overall, 
the public sector banks account for 46 percent of all assets in German banking.  
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Note: Asset shares are measured by total assets. Savings & loans are excluded as the bank statistic allows no 
attribution to public and private ownership. All data refer to January 2008. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Bank Statistics 3/08 
Foreign banks play only a minor role in German banking. In Figure 1, the 2.1 percent asset 
share of foreign banks captures only those banks that operate with legally non-autonomous 
branches in Germany. Legally autonomous subsidiaries are counted among the domestic 
banks. However, even if the subsidiaries of foreign banks are included, Germany is among the 
countries with the lowest share of foreign banks in Europe. The foreign asset share – measured 
by the ratio of total assets of foreign banks to total assets of all banks in a country – amounts to 
little more than 10 percent. Among the EU countries, only Sweden has a lower foreign asset 
share [see ECB (2008, Tables 2, 11 and 13)]. This aspect makes our study in bank 
performance across governance structures a relatively clean experiment as confounding effects 
of foreign ownership are largely irrelevant. 
                                                 
7 IKB’s largest shareholder is the state-owned bank KfW. After major losses in international financial markets, 
the KfW first had to increase its share from 38 to 91 percent and later sold the IKB to Lone Star in October 2008.    6  
Apart from a very low market penetration by foreign banks, the German banking sector also 
stands out by a large market share of state-owned banks. The latter aspect provides us with a 
relatively large sample of public sector banks for our performance study. Several countries 
such as Austria, France and Italy have significantly reduced public ownerships in their banking 
systems in recent years. Figure 2 provides some information on the market share of publicly 
owned banks in selected European countries. The data taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2002) refer to the year 1995 and describe the share of the assets of the top 10 
banks in a given country that is owned by the government. The World Bank data use a 
different classification. Here the market share is loosely defined as the ratio of assets of 
publicly owned banks to total assets in the banking sector. The data refer to the years 1999 and 
2005. Compared to other highly industrialized economies, the exceptionally large involvement 
of the public sector in German banking has become particularly evident in recent years. 
Figure 2: Asset Shares of Publicly Owned Banks in Selected European Countries 
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Note: The figures for Germany are not directly comparable with the public sector share in Figure 1. Figure 1 
excludes savings & loans and counts all assets of special purpose banks as publicly owned. 
Sources: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), World Bank - Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Database (2000 and 2007), http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
2.2 Public Bank Performance Prior to the Current Banking Crisis 
Do public banks in Germany show signs of poor financial performance even prior to the 
current banking crisis? The history of financial turmoil surrounding these banks suggests so. 
The IMF (2006) calculates that the Landesbanken received capital injections of almost € 9 
billion from 1991 to 2005 from their public owners (Table 1). Many of these capital injections 
were needed to replenish the capital base after large losses.
8 
                                                 
8 Sinn (1999) delivers a critical analysis prior to the abolishment of some special privileges 
(“Gewährträgerhaftung” and “Anstaltslast”) for German state banks.    7  
The West LB, which is owned by the state, the municipalities and the savings banks of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, provides an illustration. Soon after its foundation in 1973, the bank lost 
DM 300 millions in foreign exchange trading. During the Russian crisis of 1998, the bank 
made headlines again due to massive losses from non-collateralized investments. In 2003, the 
West LB faced its most severe crisis so far when it lost almost € 4 billion. During the current 
financial crisis, the West LB initially announced (moderate) write-downs. In November 2007, 
the bank was no longer able to get short-run financing for its long-run real estate loans. The 
owners had to agree on a capital injection of € 2 billion. A few weeks later, the capital needs 
turned out to be even larger and the owners had to increase their capital guarantees to € 5 
billion so that the West LB could transfer its risky business of € 23 billion to a special purpose 
vehicle. Another example involved the LB Berlin, which was merged into the holding 
company Bankgesellschaft Berlin in 1994. Bankgesellschaft Berlin engaged in large-scale real 
estate speculation over the period 1994 to 2001 and had to be saved by a capital injection of 
€1.7 billion and a loan guarantee amounting to € 21.6 billion.  
The IMF (2006, 76) judgment on the historic performance of German state-owned banks is 
rather harsh: “LBs [Landesbanken] have been providing poor financial returns, resulting in 
average opportunity costs to taxpayers equivalent to about ¼ percent of GDP annually since 
the early 1990s.” 
2.3 Public and Private Bank Performance in the Current Banking Crisis 
The most recent banking crisis provides a controlled experiment which allows a more 
systematic performance comparison of state-owned and privately owned banks.   
The German Council of Economic Experts [Sachverständigenrat (2008)] calculates a total 
write-down of $ 48.8 billion for German banks. These data were collected from press articles 
on the interim reports of major German banks (January 2007 until May 2008). The break-
down according to bank type paints a striking picture. Even though the asset share of the 
Landesbanken is only 21 percent, these state-owned banks account for 43 percent of the total 
write-downs. Including other state-owned banks does not change the picture. The share of all 
public banks in total assets amounts to 42 percent according to the World Bank Statistics. In 
the financial crisis, however, they account for 64 percent of all write-downs in the German 
banking system. 
The current paper extends the study undertaken by the Council of Economic Experts both in 
the sample size and the time period covered. We select all German banks with total assets 
above € 40 billion in January 2007. This sample consists of the 29 largest German banks with 
bank assets above € 40 billion, of which 13 are state-owned (for the majority of shares) and 16 
are private banks. For every bank, we investigate crisis related losses for the period from the 
first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2008 that were published until December 31, 2008. 
For this purpose we study the news wires and press releases about asset write-downs and about 
losses from operating and investment activity. Furthermore, all income statements over the 7 
quarters were separately examined as a cross-check and to capture losses not reported in press 
releases. Typically, quarterly income statements reported crisis related bank losses in the 
footnotes and/or appendices. For 4 of the 29 banks, documentation of bank losses and asset 
write-downs was missing or so incomplete that we could not establish a quantitative 
performance measure. These banks were excluded from any performance regression.
9 Table 2 
reports the bank losses for the 25 banks for which we could calculate losses in the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. Quarterly losses were simply added up without discounting. We would 
have preferred to rely solely on annual reports which are audited by certified accountants. 
                                                 
9 These banks are Depfa Deutsche Pfandbrief Bank, Essenhyp, NRW Bank and WL Bank,     8  
However, due to the time constraints of this study and the delay in the publication of annual 
reports, we use quarterly statements complemented by press releases. Interviews with 
accounting experts confirmed that some banks may not promptly update the entire accounting 
data. Some risk evaluations are too complex to be carried out on a quarterly basis. In times of a 
crisis, this can lead to delayed information about losses. Banks may also concentrate their 
write-downs in one quarter for reasons of strategic news management. However, interviews 
with accounting experts reassured us about the second-order magnitude of these shortcomings: 
Private banks tend to dispose of more timely and more comprehensive accounting data. Any 
reporting bias due to delayed reporting should tend to underestimate the losses of state banks. 
Unfortunately it is also not possible to disaggregate the losses further into specific sub-
categories such as U.S.-mortgage related losses or losses related to bank failure (Lehman 
Brothers, Icelandic banks, etc).  Also a more detailed use of balance sheet positions is 
prevented by two factors. First, some banks in the sample use ‘mark to market’ accounting for 
most of 2007 and 2008, while others continued to publish income statements under the 
‘historic value accounting’. Second, in the course of the banking crisis in the fall of 2008, 
‘mark to market’ was suspended by some institutions, which further complicates the picture. 
Table 2 summarizes the key financial statistics for each of the 29 sample banks. Three 
measures of bank size are reported. The total asset value [column (3) in Table 2] and the tier 1 
capital [column (5)] of each bank at the end of 2006 and 2007 are averaged to obtain size 
proxies. Similarly, we average the book value of equity [column (4)] at the end of 2006 and 
2007 to obtain a measure of equity capital. This allows us to calculate a leverage proxy 
[column (6)] as the ratio of total asset to book equity. Some of the regressions use (log of) 
leverage as a control variable in the performance regressions. To control for bank size, we 
normalize the losses by total assets and by equity capital [columns (8) and (9)]. The last rows 
in columns (8) and (9) illustrate the significantly higher losses in state-owned banks compared 
to private banks. The Spearman rank test shows that their respective performance difference is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This is an exact test (valid for small samples) which makes 
no distributional assumptions. 
Next, we report OLS regressions to examine further whether state-owned banks had a 
disproportional share of the bank losses in the recent financial crisis. Summary statistics on all 
regression variables are provided in Table 3. Regression specification (1) in Table 4 uses the 
(log of the) bank losses normalized by bank assets as the dependent variable. Regression 
models (2) to (5) consider the (log of the) bank loss as the dependent variable. Regression 
controls here are bank size proxied by the log of total assets or by the log of tier 1 capital. We 
have also included bank leverage defined as the log ratio of bank book equity to total assets. 
The coefficient of interest concerns the dummy variable which marks state-ownership with 
one and which is zero for privately owned banks. In each of the five specifications, the dummy 
variable marking the state-owned banks shows a positive value significant at the 3 percent 
level. As a robustness check, we calculated (but do not report) t-values in Table 4 and all 
following regressions under bootstrapping and find that the statistical significance of the 
results remains unchanged. The magnitude of the coefficient of 0.842 to 1.208 implies that the 
losses of the state-owned banks are 132% to 235% (= 100×exp(0.842)-100 to 100×exp(1.208)-
100) higher than for their private counterparts. This constitutes an economically large 
difference in the crisis performance between private and state-owned banks.  
What accounts for the poor historic performance of state-owned banks and their statistically 
significant underperformance in the recent financial crisis? The following section develops 
some plausible hypotheses about the performance differences.    9  
3. Hypotheses about Bank Governance and Crisis Performance 
The systematic performance shortfall of state controlled banks in the current financial crisis 
calls for an explanation. Given that all state banks share by definition a common type of 
owner, corporate governance is a natural starting point.  
A common argument in the economic literature against state ownership is that the state is a 
very weak and ineffective principal. This may be reflected by board members who owe their 
mandate to political connections rather than financial competence. But what is the linkage 
between supervisory board composition and crisis performance? To clarify causal 
relationships, it is helpful to conjecture different channels. We highlight 5 different 
hypotheses: 
H1: Strong Monitoring Hypothesis 
Board competence matters for the quality of a bank’s investment strategy. Poorly monitored 
CEOs and management teams can pursue investment strategies of higher risk and low risk-
adjusted return. The high risk strategies get exposed during a financial crisis and generate 
higher losses.  
H2: Gambling for Profitability Hypothesis 
Banks with a viable business model reflected in poorer operating performances pursue riskier 
investment strategies. These improve profits in normal times at the risk of higher losses during 
a crisis. 
H3: Weak Monitoring Hypothesis 
Board competence matters indirectly through the selection and appointment of a capable CEO 
and his top management team. Less competent supervisory boards chose more competent 
management teams, which leads to better operating performance.  
H4: Managerial Constraints Hypothesis 
State-owned banks operate under pay constraints for the CEO and top management. In a 
competitive labour market for talent, they end up with the worst managers and therefore have 
worse operating and crisis performance. 
H5: Efficient Executive Pay Hypothesis 
Even in the absence of pay constraints, better paying institutions might be able to attract better 
managers. Hence, higher executive pay for a bank's top management comes along with better 
risk management and better crisis performance.  
The strong monitoring hypothesis H1 assumes a direct role of the supervisory board in 
constraining and/or improving the risk choices of management. Poor competitiveness has 
recently been evoked as a motivation for excessive risk taking by state-owned bank as 
expressed in hypothesis H2. Hellwig (2008) reports that state banks were "caught up in a yield 
panic" in a time when their intermediation and interest rate margins were low. Industry 
observers point out that state-owned banks did not have a viable business model based on 
some competitive advantage [Münchau (2008)]. This might have put greater pressure on state 
banks to seek higher yields in higher risk. But it is important to note that the ‘gambling for 
profitability hypothesis’ as such cannot explain the underperformance of state banks. The 
hypothesis only explains underperformance during the crisis with previous underperformance 
in operational activity without specifying where the latter originates in. While plausible, it    10 
needs to be combined with the ‘weak monitoring hypothesis’ to provide a full explanation. H2 
and H3 are therefore complementary. The weak monitoring hypothesis does not require the 
same level of supervisory board involvement as its ‘strong’ counterpart H1 and therefore 
seems more in line with anecdotal evidence about actual governance practices. Such anecdotal 
evidence suggests that supervisory boards typically do not scrutinize the investment strategy of 
the executive board. 
Both H1 and the combination of H2 and H3 imply a correlation between supervisory board 
competence and state ownership on the one hand and between board competence and crisis 
performance on the other hand. We investigate both issues empirically in sections 4 and 5, 
respectively. H2 presupposes operational underperformance of state-owned banks. This issue 
is further investigated in Section 6.1.  
Hypothesis H4 presents an alternative (board independent) explanation for underperformance 
of state-owned banks. Here it is state-ownership itself rather than governance deficiencies 
which account for the poor crisis performance of state-owned banks. The hypothesis claims 
that state-owned banks are constrained in the remuneration of their executives and, therefore, 
attract less competent managers. We test this alternative hypothesis by examining top 
executive salaries in state banks relative to private banks in section 6.2.  
Finally, we examine the role of executive pay levels in the crisis. The efficient executive pay 
hypothesis states that executive compensation simply reflects the value of scarce 
competencies. Higher paid executive management teams should then be able to undertake 
better investment strategies. This will pay off in particular in the moment of reckoning which 
is the financial crisis. The respective evidence is discussed in Section 6.3.  
4. Supervisory Board Competence across State-Owned and Private Banks 
Both the weak and the strong monitoring hypothesis conjecture that supervisory board 
competence matters. The selection of talented executives and/or their effective monitoring 
requires that the relevant competencies are available in the supervisory board. In particular, the 
members of the supervisory board may need a comprehensive understanding of modern 
financial markets. Testing such a proposition requires us to produce proxy variables for board 
competence. Secondly, we need to document that these measures indeed show a competence 
gap between the boards of state-owned and private banks. 
4.1 Related Research 
Much of the corporate finance literature has focused on formal rather than qualitative measures 
of boardroom composition, mostly board independence, board size and directors’ stock 
ownership. The evidence on the role of board independence as measured by the number of 
outside directors remains mixed. Some studies show no performance effect for board 
independence [Bhagat and Black (2002), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Klein (1995), 
MacAvoy et al. (1983), Mehran (1995)], while others identify a significant positive 
performance effect of board independence [Baysinger and Butler (1985), Schellinger, Wood 
and Tashakori (1989)]. Board size on the other hand is generally found to be negatively 
correlated with performance measures [Brown and Maloney (1999), Yermack (1996)]. With a 
large supervisory board, the free-riding of individual board members may lead to a low 
monitoring effort. There is also evidence that director ownership in a firm correlates with 
better performance measured by Tobin’s Q [Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988)].     11 
Two recent papers look at more qualitative measures with respect to board composition. 
Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) examine the role of financial board expertise and find that 
it matters in the presence of conflicts of interest between contracting parties. In contrast to our 
paper, they analyse the role of financial expertise in the boards of non-financial firms. Another 
important qualitative dimension of supervisory competencies is the industry experience of 
board members. Papakonstantinou (2008) shows that industry experience correlates positively 
with abnormal stock returns and negatively with earnings manipulation. A particularly original 
approach to identifying causal links between monitoring and corporate performance is taken 
by Becker et al. (2008). They show that the presence of rich individual shareholders on U.S. 
company boards improves the operating and financial performance of the firms. The authors 
use the density of high-wealth individuals in the proximity of the company headquarters as an 
exogenous instrument to eliminate reverse causality and also control for self-selection effects.   
4.2 Measures of Supervisory Board Competence 
Our own study takes a further step towards qualitative measurement of boardroom competence 
by focusing on a single industry – the banking sector – and by collecting an entire set of 
competence indicators. We focus on the 29 largest banks in Germany which exceed € 40 
billion in total assets (see Table 2).  
To obtain a measure of the monitoring potential in the supervisory boards of these 29 banks, 
we define 14 different biographical criteria which proxy for boardroom competence in the 
context of the financial crisis. The variables capture a board member’s educational background 
(3 indicator variables), finance experience (6 indicator variables) and management experience 
(5 indicator variables).  
For each member of the supervisory boards of 29 banks, we collected the relevant data from 
publicly available sources. Most of the information could be retrieved from the annual 
statements and the web sites of the banks. In many cases, board members hold other prominent 
positions (e.g., as top executives in other firms or as politicians) enabling us to use information 
provided by their main affiliation. The data set was supplemented with material from 
biographical encyclopedia or news reports about the board members. The reference date for 
board memberships was January 1, 2008. In cases where deputy members are allowed on 
supervisory boards, we included data on both the regular member and the deputy, e.g., the 
prime minister of a state and the undersecretary of state. 
4.2.1. Educational Background 
We conjecture here that educational background matters for the monitoring ability of 
supervisory board members. This may be particularly the case in banking where judgement on 
a particular investment strategy often requires a high degree of financial literacy. We define 
three levels of educational achievement by the following 3 criteria: 
  E1: Does the board member hold a Business/Economics Degree? If the answer is yes, 
the criterion E1 is marked as 1 and 0 otherwise. It is conjectured that extensive training 
in economics and finance may improve the monitoring ability of supervisory board 
members. 
  E2: Does the board member hold a MBA Degree? Some executives hold MBA degrees 
and these also confer on the holder a more extensive knowledge of accounting, finance 
and economics.     12 
  E3: Does the board member hold a PhD Degree in Business/Economics? A PhD degree 
signals advanced knowledge and a capacity for abstract economic thought, provides an 
easier access to the scientific literature and enables a boarder judgement on financial 
instruments and their risks.
10  
4.2.2 Finance Experience 
Effective monitoring of bank managers may involve industry-specific knowledge which 
depends on experience. We distinguish 6 criteria: 
  F1: Does the board member have Banking Experience? The person is considered to 
have banking experience if he or she has ever worked in a bank. 
  F2: Does the board member have Financial Market Experience? As financial market 
experience we record any previous occupation related to asset market trading or 
investment. Financial market experience should make the board member a better 
monitor of investment risks.
11   
  F3: Does the board member have Financial Market Experience after 1990? As the 
human capital in financial markets depreciates over time, we also collect the 
information, whether the financial market experience is fairly recent, i.e., was gained 
after 1990.  
  F4: Does the board member have Financial Market Experience in the Same Bank?  A 
past employment in the trading or investment division of the monitored bank might 
procure the board member a particular information advantage and make him a more 
effective monitor.
12  
  F5: Does the board member have a U.S. Financial Market Experience? A managerial 
experience in oversee markets might provide the board member with better information 
access and possibly a better judgement on the institutional risks of the U.S. subprime 
market.  
  F6: Does the board member have a U.S. Financial Market Experience after 1990? This 
is the same as criterion F5, only with the additional requirement that the experience 
need to have occurred after 1990. 
                                                 
10 In cases where the exact type of doctoral degree could not be extracted from the available biographical 
information, we assume that every person with studies in business or economics and a doctoral degree has 
achieved this doctoral degree in business or economics. 
11 Gilian Tett (2008) suggests that the background of CEO and top management is crucial for crisis performance: 
‘[The most successful CEOs]… have had direct career experience of trading and managing market risk. This has 
given them an obvious advantage in navigating the credit cycle, since they presumably know what a derivative is. 
Furthermore, men such as Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman Sachs or Anshu Jain at Deutsche, who have risen through 
trading desks, instinctively tend to view everything in terms of probabilities and risk. That is a different mindset 
from somebody who has previously worked as a salesman, adviser - or lawyer, such as Mr Prince [from 
Citybank].’ 
12 We concede that past employment links to the same bank might also compromise the independence of the 
board member. Unfortunately, board member independence is not readily measureable for the German 
supervisory board members.     13 
4.2.3 Management Experience 
A professional corporate management background may provide a board member with many 
skills which make him more effective in supervising the activities of other corporate managers. 
Here we define 5 criteria which could correlate with generic monitoring ability:  
  M1: Does the board member have a Consulting Experience? Board members with a 
consulting background can typically account for a wide range of corporate experiences 
including financial distress. That may make them better monitors.  
  M2: Does the board member have a Mid-level Management Experience? This variable 
captures whether a board member has ever worked as an executive independent of the 
management level. 
  M3: Does the board member have a Top-level Financial Management Experience? It is 
registered whether a board member has ever worked in a top-level finance position. 
  M4: Does the board member have a Top-level Financial Management Experience in 
the Same Bank? This is the same criterion as M3, but restricts the experience to the 
same bank the board member is monitoring.  
  M5: Does the board member have Multiple Board Memberships? Board members who 
are appointed to several supervisory boards may be more experienced in monitoring 
the executives.
13 
4.2.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the 14 competence proxies for 593 board members in 
the 29 largest German banks. As we focus on qualitative differences in the boardroom 
composition of private and state-owned banks, the summary statistics are reported separately 
for the two types of banks. There are 215 board members in private banks and 378 board 
members in state-owned banks. Columns (1) to (6) concern the private sector banks and 
columns (7) to (12) the state-owned banks. 
According to German law, a firm size dependent number of board members are worker 
representatives for which we report separately in columns (5), (6), (11) and (12).
14 However, 
detailed biographical information on worker representatives on the bank board is often 
unavailable. Therefore, we will mostly focus on the analysis of the owner representatives. This 
leaves us with 139 board members of private banks and 268 board members of state-owned 
banks. 
All competence proxies are binomial variables, where a ‘one’ implies that the criterion is 
fulfilled and ‘zero’ otherwise. It is useful to aggregate these binomial variables to indices of 
supervisory board competence. We define 4 aggregate indices of board competence: 
  IE: Sum of a board member’s educational indicators E1 to E3 
  IF: Sum of a board member’s financial competence indicators F1 to F6 
  IM: Sum of a board member’s managerial competence indictors M1 to M5 
                                                 
13 We just capture whether a board member has additional appointments but we do not count the number of board 
memberships. 
14  According to the so called ‘Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz’, a third of the board members need to be worker 
representatives for corporations with less than 2000 employees. Beyond this threshold, the so called 
‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’ applies, which requires that half of the board members are worker representatives.    14 
  IT: Sum of all competence indicators of a board member. 
Summary statistics on these 4 aggregate measures of board competence are reported in the last 
4 rows of Table 5. 
In addition to the 14 competence indicators and the 4 aggregate indices, we also report some 
statistics on the biographical background of board members. Age provides the average age of 
the board members. Foreign Nationality is the percentage of board members born in a non-
German speaking country. Politically Appointed Board Members captures the case that high-
ranking bureaucrats and politicians holding a party and/or government office become 
representatives in a supervisory board. 
4.3 Supervisory Board Competence in Comparison 
The difference in board competence is pronounced as is evident from a comparison of proxy 
means in Table 5. For example, almost 37 percent of owner representative’s board members in 
private sector banks feature some banking experience (F1) in their curriculum vitae. In the 
state-owned sector this criterion is fulfilled only by 14.2 percent of the corresponding board 
members. The difference in financial market experience (F2) is even more pronounced at 36.7 
percent versus 10.1 percent. A similar qualitative difference is registered if one focuses on 
experience in U.S. financial markets (F5) – arguably particularly relevant with respect to the 
subprime crisis. We find U.S. financial market experience for 20.9 percent of the owner 
representatives on the board of private banks compared to only 2.6 percent for the owner 
representatives in state-owned banks.  
Also in the categories of education and management experience, the private banks have a lead 
over the state-owned banks. The board members in private banks have 30 percent more 
academic degrees in business and economics (E1) and twice as many doctoral degrees (E3). 
More than a third of the board members in private banks had a top level management position 
in finance in comparison to 12 percent in public banks (M3). The management experience in 
the same bank (M4) is almost non-existent in supervisory boards of state-owned banks. 
Columns (13) to (15) report the one-sided Fisher tests for the hypothesis that the competence 
proxies are the same for private and state-owned banks, where column (13) concerns all board 
members, column (14) the owner representatives and column (15) the worker representatives. 
The hypothesis that board competence is equal across private and state-owned banks can be 
rejected for all of the 14 board competence proxies. The hypothesis is rejected at the one 
percent level for 11 of the 14 criteria; for the remaining three criteria (Business/Econ Degree, 
Consulting Experience, Multiple Board Memberships) a false rejection of the hypothesis still 
has a probability of less than 10 percent. Moreover, differences are also qualitatively large. 
The aggregate measure of finance experience (IF) summing the six indicator variables F1 to 
F6 has a mean value of 1.51 and 0.39 for private and state-owned banks, respectively. By this 
simple linear metric, a board member in a private bank had on average a 3 times higher 
competence measure than his colleague in a state-owned institution.  
Figure 3 illustrates the difference between private and state-owned banks for the three 
competence indices plus the total index which sums all 14 criteria. To allow for a better 
comparison across the 4 indices, we have scaled them to a range from 0 to 10, where 0 implies 
that none of the index criteria are fulfilled by a board member and 10 means he fulfils all of 
them. The difference between private and state-owned banks is particularly strong with respect 
to management and finance experience of the supervisory board members.    15 
Figure 3: Supervisory Board Members in Private and Public Banks 
The figure shows the means for the competence indices of all private and public bank supervisory board 
members, respectively. To obtain better comparability across indices, each index is scaled so that values can vary 




















Source: Authors’ calculation 
One of the potential sources of fewer competencies in state-owned banks could be the practice 
of having politicians and politically appointed bureaucrats as owner representatives in the 
supervisory boards. Most of the politically connected board members made their career in 
politics and in the administration but have little experience in banking and financial markets. 
Therefore, we also test whether the competencies of politically connected board members 
significantly differ from other board members. Table 6 provides the respective evidence 
broken down into the 14 competence criteria. Column (4) states the percentage of politically 
connected board members who fulfil a criteria and column (6) the same percentage for all 
other supervisory board members. Column (7) reports p-values for the hypothesis that both 
groups feature the same distribution for a given criteria. For 5 out of the 6 financial experience 
measures we can reject equality of the 1 percent level. Politically connected board members 
fare relatively good in terms of education, but less so for the management criteria. They almost 
completely lack financial experience. 
Overall, the evidence on supervisory board composition of German banks shows a large 
competence gap between private and state-owned banks with respect to the management 
experience and financial market competence. The competence gap can largely be attributed to 
an appointment practice for state-owned banks which stacks the board with politicians and 
government employees as the shareholder representatives.    16 
Figure 4: Financial Market and Management Experience in the Supervisory Board 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
5. The Link between Supervisory Competence and Financial Losses 
5.1 Evidence on the Monitoring-Performance Linkage 
This section explores if the relative underperformance of state-owned compared to private 
banks in the recent financial crisis can be related to weak governance structures as suggested 
by our monitoring hypotheses (H1 and H3). Executives in state-owned banks may not face any 
effective monitoring by supervisory boards and are therefore more prone to choose bad 
investments or to compensate low profitability by investing in high risk assets (H2).  
As a performance measure, we use the write-downs and losses reported by the banks during 
2007 and 2008 (see Section 2.3 for a detailed description of the data). To construct explanatory 
variables we use the board members competence indices (IE, IF, IM and IT) as defined in 
Section 3.2.4. For simplicity, we assume that the quality of a bank supervisory board and its 
monitoring ability is equal to the mean competence level of its members. To allow for a better 
comparison across the 4 aggregate board indices, we scale them to a range from 0 to 10, where 
0 implies that no board member fulfils any of the index criteria and 10 implies that all board 
members fulfil all index criteria. While board quality need not to be equal to the average skill 
of its member, we cannot entertain any non-linear hypothesis here for a lack of statistical    17 
power. We therefore settle for the most straightforward definition of board competence as the 
average competence of the board members. 
The four measures of average board competence in their rescaled version are still not ideal 
regressors because of the (right-)skewedness of their distribution. In order to obtain a more 
normally distributed measure, we also undertake a log transformation given by 
)] ( 1 log[ IX mean board scaled AIX   . 
We thus obtain the (log) average board competence levels denoted as AIE, AIF, AIM, and AIT, 
respectively. Figure 4 shows the board competence with respect to financial experience (AIF) 
and management experience (AIM) in the 29 sample banks. Private banks are marked by 
squares, and state-owned banks by triangles. Based on the competence gap of individual board 
members documented in Table 5, it is no surprise that private bank boards exhibit higher 
average financial and management competence. We also note that the board indices for 
management and financial market experience are correlated across the 29 banks. Supervisory 
boards with higher financial competence generally feature more management experience. 
5.1.1. Explaining Relative Bank Losses 
Any comparison of losses related to the financial crisis has to account for the size of a bank 
and its balance sheet. This suggests that write-offs need to be standardized to make them 
comparable. As a suitable measure of normalization we use banks total assets. The baseline 
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where  AIXi  denotes one of the four board competence indices. Table 7 reports the OLS 
coefficients for the four aggregate indices, namely the board’s average educational 
achievement (AIE), its average financial experience (AIF), its management experience (AIM) 
and its total experience measure (AIT). The average educational achievement, the management 
experience and the total experience measure do not show a statistically significant correlation 
with bank losses. However, a board’s average finance experience is significant at the 5 percent 
level. We also note that the estimated coefficient has a large economic significance. The 
standard deviation for finance competence (AIF) across banks is 0.428. Hence, a one standard 
deviation deterioration in a board’s finance competence implies 59% (= 
100×exp(1.083*0.428)-100) increase in the ratio of bank losses to total assets.  
Figure 5 illustrates this linkage between financial board competence and bank losses by 
plotting the latter against the former. Banks with financially competent supervisory boards 
exhibit lower losses. Figure 5 also shows again the pronounced differences between private 
and state-owned banks. The higher financial competence in private banks boards goes along 
with lower losses. Differences in board competence are therefore very coherent explanation for 
the pronounced underperformance of state-owned banks documented in section 2.3.    18 
Figure 5: Losses during the Subprime Crisis and Board Competence in Finance 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
5.1.2. Explaining Absolute Bank Losses using Size Controls  
An alternative regression specification consists in taking (the log of) the bank losses as the 
dependent variable. In this case, we need to control for bank size with a separate independent 
variable which controls for bank size. We use the log of the total assets at the end of 2006 and 
2007 and the log of tier 1 capital as alternative size controls. Table 8 reports the OLS 
regression results for the extended specification,  
i i i i Size Bank AIX Losses         ) log( ) log( 2 1 0 , 
where we control for the banks size instead of scaling by it. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained in the baseline specification. The index for finance competence (AIF) 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level; the other indices are insignificant at the 
standard levels. The coefficients are again qualitatively large: In the case of total assets as a 
size control [column (3)], a one standard deviation decrease in financial competence of the 
supervisory board implies a 69% (= 100×exp(1.224*0.428)-100) increase in bank losses.  
As expected bank size measured by (log) total assets is also highly significant for explaining 
absolute (log) bank losses with an estimated coefficient around 1. Bank losses are therefore    19 
approximately linear in bank size. The tier 1 capital as alternative size control is also highly 
significant and exhibits a coefficient slightly above 1 indicating that losses increase more than 
proportionally with bank size. We also verified that the above regressions are robust to the 
inclusion of leverage as an additional control variable. Additional leverage controls did not 
qualitatively change the results. The extended specification features a much higher adjusted R-
squared of 54 percent for specifications (3) and of 70 percent for specification (7) compared to 
only 15 percent in the corresponding specification reported in Table 7. However, the 
considerably higher explanatory power in Table 8 is largely due to the size variables (log of) 
total assets, which was previously used to scale the dependent variable, and (log of) tier 1 
capital. 
We also asked which of the 6 financial experience indicators for board members matters most 
for a bank’s crisis performance. But under the constraint of a very small sample, such 
disaggregation did not produce any clear insights. We were not able to reject the null 
hypothesis that all 6 indicators matter equally. A more disaggregate approach requires a larger 
bank sample and more statistical power. 
5.2. Endogeneity in the Monitoring-Performance Linkage  
The statistically and economically significant linkage between measures of supervisory board 
competence in finance and bank losses reported in Tables 7 and 8 represent a correlation and 
not necessarily a causal relationship. So-called endogeneity of the board composition is a 
major issue for any corporate governance study. Performance difference between corporations 
may be driven by other factors which also drive board composition. For example, a bank CEO 
may pursue an investment policy without a proper risk control. Such a high-risk investment 
strategy may be in line with his pay incentive, or serve to disguise deficient operating 
performance in other areas of the bank’s business. Such a CEO has a particular interest in the 
appointment of supervisory board members who do not scrutinize his investment policy. If the 
CEO can influence board appointments, as is generally the case, a supervisory board with low 
monitoring ability should result endogenously. The implied correlation between bank losses 
and a low competence index then reflects CEO’s ability to manipulate board composition. 
Recent research on board composition also shows that corporate boards are often dominated 
by particular networks related to the educational or professional background of the network 
members [Bertrand et al. (2008), Kramarz and Thesmar (2008)]. The large representation of 
politicians and bureaucrats on the state-owned bank boards may therefore have indirect effects 
on the choice of co-opted board members. Unlike in studies on the board composition of 
private sector corporations, we can clearly identify state-ownership as an exogenous 
determinant of board composition and board competence. Important exogenous drivers of 
board composition should mitigate the relative importance its endogenous determination and 
also generate more sample heterogeneity with respect to board composition.  
A statistical strategy of controlling for endogeneity is to use instrumental variables which 
capture exogenous aspects of board composition. As shown in Section 4 of the paper, board 
composition of state-owned banks is largely conditioned by ownership structure. State-owned 
bank feature a large number of politically appointed board members and we can assume that 
the percentage of political representatives may be outside the influence of the CEO. At the 
same time, the percentage of political board appointments correlates (negatively) with board 
competence, making it a good ‘instrument’. Also the public ownership status itself cannot be 
influenced by the CEO. This suggests two instruments, namely the percentage of political 
representatives and a dummy for state-ownership.     20 
Table 9 reports the same regressions as Table 8, except that the competence index is now 
instrumented. This should eliminate any reverse causality which may result from the CEO’s 
ability to manipulate board composition. The last line in Table 9 reports the F-statistics for the 
first stage regression, which shows that both variables are reasonable decent instruments for 
the different board competence indices (except education) in line with the evidence in Table 6. 
The point estimates for the IV coefficients are again negative, and according to a Hausman test 
statistically not different from the corresponding OLS coefficients. The statistical significance 
level of the financial competence index in specifications (3) and (7) is now 1 percent and 5 
percent, respectively. Overall, these results imply that the negative association of bank losses 
and supervisory board competence reflects causality running from board competence to bank 
performance and not in the reverse direction. 
Does state-ownership induce other endogenous differences in the bank loan policies relative to 
private sector banks? Two effects are particularly plausible: First, research on Italian state-
owned banks has shown a loan preference towards local investment projects where the 
political party of the board representative had strong election results [Sapienza (2004)]. This 
effect is hardly surprising if politicians on a bank board influence a bank’s investment policy. 
However, such a ‘home or voter bias’ can hardly explain excessive investments by German 
banks in the U.S. mortgage market. The endogenous home bias effect should induce ceteris 
paribus lower subprime related losses for state-owned banks. 
A second plausible investment bias of state-owned banks concerns their risk aversion. Political 
board representatives may see employees as part of their constituency. The interest of the 
employees is to avoid excessive risk taking similar to bond holders. A greater concern of state-
owned banks for employee interests should bias their investment policy against any strategy 
which may ‘wreck the ship’.
15 In summary, endogenous differences in the loan policy of state-
owned banks are plausible, but they should bias results against finding financial losses 
concentrated in the state-controlled part of the banking sector. 
6. Distinguishing Alternative Hypothesis about Performance Differences 
6.1 Bank Governance Channels  
The evidence presented so far suggests that supervisory boards stacked with political 
appointees could not effectively exercise their monitoring role. Deficient governance could 
have had dramatic consequences through two different channels. First, deficient bank 
governance implied that CEOs and bank managers were free to pursue bad investment 
strategies in line with short-term pay incentives. We called this the strong monitoring 
hypothesis (H1). It assumes that board quality matters directly for the quality of a bank's 
investment strategy. It requires a relatively high influence of board members on the corporate 
decision process. A second channel might operate more indirectly. Competent supervisory 
boards select a competent bank leadership which improves operating performance (H3). 
Improved competitiveness avoids 'gambling for profitability' strategies which underlie 
disastrous performance during a financial crisis. Both governance channels are not mutually 
exclusive. The gambling for profitability hypothesis (H2) provides a plausible explanation for 
the relative larger losses of state banks if we find evidence for a corresponding shortfall in 
operating performance prior to the crisis. It is therefore interesting to compare the operating 
                                                 
15 The executives of state banks may also pursue an excessively risky strategy to disguise low operating profits. 
Such excessive risk-taking, however, is part of the “gambling for profitability” hypothesis and is discussed in 
Section 6.1.    21 
performance across state and private banks and also relate them to our measures of board 
competence. 
Table 10 reports regression results for three different measures of operating performance. We 
examine alternatively the annual return on book assets, the return on book equity, and the per 
capita profits defined as the ratio of annual operating profits and the number of bank 
employees.
16 Whenever available, this operating data was collected for the pre-crisis period 
1998-2006. By all three measures, the private banks show on average a better operating 
performance as shown in columns (1), (4) and (7). The performance difference is economically 
large as a comparison of the dummy variable (capturing the lower performance of state banks) 
and the constant term shows. State-owned banks have on average a 36% lower return on book 
assets, and a 27% lower return on book equity. However, the annual profit variability is very 
high so that these differences are not statistically significant at conventional confidence 
levels.
17  
Per capita profits reported in columns (7) to (9) may represent the most accurate measure of 
operating performance. For private banks the operating profits per bank employee averaged € 
200,000 for 1998-2006. By contrast, average profitability in the state banks is only € 40,000 
per employee [see column (7)].
18 The negative correlation between state ownership and 
operating profitability is again economically large, but statistically not significant. Column (8) 
relates operating performance directly to financial board competence (AIF). Here we find a 
statistically significant relationship in spite of the small sample size. An improvement of 
financial board competence by one standard deviation (0.428) is related to improvement in per 
capita profits by € 0.181 million (0.423*0.428).  
The statistical nexus between financial board competence, operating performance and crisis 
losses underline the plausibility of the gambling for profitability hypothesis (H2). The banks 
with the least competent supervisory boards show the weakest operating performance and this 
might have created a pressure to compensate operational underperformance with higher levels 
of risk taking. In an efficient financial market, higher levels of market risk are systematically 
compensated by higher expected returns. But bank investment in illiquid mortgage securities 
may be far from this efficient market benchmark and could therefore combine high levels of 
market risk and low expected returns due to default risk.  
Better executive monitoring in private banks can be facilitated not only by more competent 
boards, but also by public trading of their equity as well as other marketable bank assets. Asset 
trading by informed investors can provide the supervisory board with valuable signals which 
alert supervisory board members to undesirable investment strategies. A declining stock price 
allows supervisory board members to challenge a CEO and/or request further explanations 
about the bank’s investment policy.
19 However, such external monitoring (due to public 
trading) may require a high degree of bank transparency beyond current accounting standards. 
This may explain why we find only a weak negative correlation between public trading of 
bank equity and bank losses in our sample.
20       
                                                 
16 Return to equity (if measured at market values) and per capita profits are both sensitive to financial leverage, 
which (according to book values) in Table 2, column (7) is higher for private banks. This could go some way in 
explaining higher relative profitability for these two measures.    
17 We also examined the variability of operating profits similar to Laeven and Levine (2008), but could not find 
any systematic difference between private and state-owned banks.  
18 Of course, per capita profits depend on the labour intensity of a business. However, as the state banks do not 
operate in the particularly labour-intensive market segment of consumer retail business, they should ceteris 
paribus have higher rather than lower per capita profits than their private counterparts.  
19 Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2009) provide evidence that bank equity prices are informative of the 
solvency of bank lenders. See also Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000). 
20 We note that 6 of the 16 private banks and 2 of the 13 state-owned banks are publicly traded.    22 
6.2 State Ownership as Managerial Constraint 
An alternative interpretation of the larger losses during the crisis is that state-owned banks face 
constraints not shared by their private sector competitors. Such a 'managerial constraint 
hypothesis' (H4) may apply particularly to salary limits for CEOs and top managers. The 
hypothesis could be relevant in a highly competitive managerial labour market, in which the 
most competent bank managers seek and obtain higher paid jobs in private banks. The poor 
financial performance of the state-owned banks in the current banking crisis could be a 
reflection of such ‘suboptimal’ managerial constraints. The low competence of the supervisory 
boards in this explanation would be accidental and irrelevant to the observed 
underperformance of state-owned banks.  
The role of executive salaries is examined in Table 11. We use data on the executive board 
compensation of the 29 banks from the accounting statements in 2006. To avoid a possible 
bias due to different accounting standards (historic value vs. market value), we eliminate all 
(pension related) deferred compensation from the data. The total compensation of an executive 
board is then divided by the number of board members to obtain the average salary of an 
executive board member. We use the (log of the) average compensation as the dependent 
variable. The bank size measured by the log of total assets represents a highly significant 
control variable in all specifications. Larger banks pay higher salaries to their top level 
executives. This finding corresponds to very similar results for CEO salaries in the U.S. 
(Landier and Gabaix, 2008). The negative sign for the state bank dummy in column (1) reveals 
that executive board members earn on average less in state banks. But the average pay 
difference of 10% (= 100×exp(0.95)-100) is economically and statistically insignificant. It is 
rather implausible that such a small pay differential amounts to a managerial constraint in state 
banks to hire talented executive board members. Column (2) reveals that banks with a larger 
share of board members with political affiliations pay less to their executives. But a decrease 
of politically affiliated board representatives by one standard deviation (0.21) increases 
executive compensation by a modest 14% (= 100×exp(0.612*0.21)-100). We also note that the 
most competent supervisory boards did not approve considerably higher executive pay as is 
evident in column (3). An increase in financial board competence by one standard deviation 
increased executive pay only by 5%. To the extent that the quality of the appointed executive 
boards drive operating and crisis performance, higher executive board quality appears to be 
available through better manager selection and/or board supervision rather than higher 
salaries. 
We do not find any evidence for other managerial constraints which differentiate private and 
state-owned banks in Germany. Both private sector and state-owned banks operate in the same 
labour market for managerial talent; hence, it is hard to come up with any competitive 
disadvantage faced by the state-owned banks. The only difference is a historic public 
guarantee of state bank debt. The latter amounts to a competitive advantage not enjoyed by the 
private sector banks. The public guarantee (“Gewährträgerhaftung”) for the Landesbanken was 
revoked under EU competition law in 2001. This eliminated differences between public and 
private banks rather than being an additional constraint on public banks. There exists a 
generous interim arrangement, whereby the public guarantee is still valid for all liabilities 
which were incurred until 2005 and which become mature before 2015. It is occasionally 
argued that this interim arrangement could have created an incentive for cheap additional bank 
borrowing before July 2005. But accounting measures for leverage in Table 2, column (7), 
show in fact a lower leverage for state-owned banks than for private banks in 2006/7. For a 
lack of evidence, we discard hypothesis H4.    23 
6.3 Executive Pay and Crisis Performance 
Even in the absence of significant pay difference between private and state banks, salary levels 
may still relate to managerial quality and therefore crisis performance. Does investment in a 
more expensive executive board pay off in times of crisis? According to the 'efficient 
executive pay hypothesis' (H5), higher executive salaries should be correlated with better crisis 
performance. But an inverse relationship between executive pay and crisis performance is also 
plausible. In this case higher salaries for the executive board members may just reflect a lack 
of effective supervisory board control and other agency problems.
21 
Table 12 revisits the crisis performance regressions with executive pay as an additional control 
variable. The bank losses positively correlate with the level of executive pay. This positive 
relationship is statistically significant at the 10 percent level once we also control for 
differences in financial supervisory board competence in column (3). Hence, the investment 
return to higher executive pay was ceteris paribus negative for German banks as better paid 
executives suffered larger losses – not smaller ones. This allows us to discredit the ‘efficient 
executive pay’ hypothesis. Underinvestment in executive pay packages is certainly not what 
explains the crisis performance of German banks.  
7. Summary with Policy Conclusions 
Economists have long recognized the fragility of bank institutions and the systemic risk that 
they pose to the real economy. Unlike most other limited liability companies, banks feature 
high leverage and their maturity transformation exposes them to additional liquidity risks more 
than any other industry sector. Their pivotal role in financing the investment activity of small 
and medium sized companies implies that financial distress by banks carries large 
macroeconomic costs. Banks should therefore be subject to a particular regulatory framework, 
which imposes minimum capital requirements, requires effective systems of internal risk 
management and appropriate disclosure policies. 
The current financial crisis confirms these conventional views [IMF (2008)], but also provides 
some new lessons. The regulatory system did not sufficiently constrain the risk choices of 
many financial institutions. Particularly in the U.S., financial institutions such as investment 
banks were allowed to operate as a ‘shadow banking system’ outside of traditional banking 
supervision. The lenient regulation allowed the banks to reduce equity as far as possible in 
order to benefit from the higher returns which come with higher leverage. Moreover, political 
lobbying by the financial industry itself may have contributed to the lenient regulatory regime 
which rendered bank supervision less effective. 
In the light of the recent experience, bank regulation needs to be strengthened. However, it is 
less clear how to shield national bank supervision from the very political interference which 
has weakened it in the past. More political independence of bank supervision similar to central 
bank independence seems desirable [Rochet (2008)]. Some have even called for an 
international financial regulator to provide political insulation from national politics [Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008)]. Nevertheless, tougher banking regulation will have to face up to future 
political challenges which may again undermine its very effectiveness. 
                                                 
21 High-powered incentives for the top management (e.g., through stock options) may influence managerial risk-
taking and therefore a bank's crisis performance. For instance, Mehran and Rosenberg (2007) show that CEO 
stock option holdings increase asset volatility. Unfortunately, there are no suitable data on performance pay for 
the 29 German banks under consideration.     24 
It is therefore important to explore parallel policy measures which may strengthen bank 
stability even further. Here, our performance and governance analysis of German banks in the 
recent financial crisis offers interesting insights. The large role played by state-owned banks in 
the German banking sector implies that corporate governance is extremely heterogeneous in an 
otherwise identical regulatory environment. Studying the biographies of 593 board members in 
the 29 largest German banks reveals that the financial and managerial competence of 
supervisory board members is systematically lower in state-owned banks compared to private 
banks. This statistically significant result should in itself raise concerns about the state-
ownership of bank unless one negates the monitoring role of supervisory boards altogether. 
A performance comparison of state-owned and private banks in the 2007/2008 banking crisis 
reveals that state-owned banks performed significantly worse. Controlling for bank size, the 
losses of state-owned banks are on average three times as large as those of their private 
competitors. The small sample of 25 observations may raise robustness concerns. However, 
abundant anecdotal evidence on many previous large-scale investment failures by German 
state-owned banks is certainly not in contradiction to the statistical findings.  
We then relate bank crisis performance directly to measures of supervisory board competence. 
The evidence suggests that the monitoring ability of the supervisory board matters for the 
financial fragility of banks. Financial expertise of the supervisory board correlates with crisis 
performance at a 5 percent statistical significance level even in our small sample. We interpret 
this correlation as a causal linkage from governance to crisis performance because the 
instrumented version of the same regression produces very similar regression coefficients. 
Assuming that CEOs of state-owned companies cannot alter the percentage of political 
representatives in their supervisory board, we can use this percentage as an exogenous 
instrument, which is nevertheless strongly correlated with financial board competence. Equal 
coefficients for the instrumented and ordinary regressions are evidence against the reverse 
causality, whereby particularly reckless bank CEOs co-opt incompetent board members as 
their monitors. 
The analysis also undertakes some tentative steps in exploring the channel through which 
supervisory board competence could matter. For this, we distinguish between a strong and a 
weak monitoring hypothesis. The former assumes that supervisory board monitoring directly 
influences the quality of the key investment decisions by the executive board. The latter 
concedes that such a high level of supervisory board involvement may not be realistic. Instead, 
supervisory board competence matters through the selection of the executive board. Better 
executive selection improves operating performance and the latter avoids a 'gambling for 
profitability' which allegedly characterized the investment behaviour of state-owned banks. 
We check if state-owned banks indeed suffered from lower operating profitability and find 
supportive evidence. Moreover, higher financial board competence also correlates with better 
operating performance. Risky investment choices might therefore have been the flipside to 
poor operating performance. 
Finally, we explore the role of executive pay for the crisis performance. There is no evidence 
for the 'efficient executive pay hypothesis' whereby the return to higher executives 
compensation consists in better investment strategies and less bank fragility. We rather find 
evidence to the contrary. Higher executive pay correlates with higher crisis losses, which 
suggest that particularly large executive pay package signal not better management but rather 
more severe agency problems. 
Overall, our case study shows that state ownership comes at the costs of weaker monitoring of 
bank managers, possibly higher risk exposure and higher bank losses in a financial crisis. This 
finding is important given that state-ownership has even increased in the wake of the current 
crisis. The policy conclusions are straightforward. First, state ownership in the banking sector    25 
should be reduced as far as possible.
22 Second, whenever state ownership is unavoidable, the 
financial competences of the supervisory boards have to be strengthened. Instead of installing 
politically connected board members, the state should delegate financial experts to the 
supervisory boards. Third, private institutions may similarly benefit from a more competent 
supervisory board.
23 Enhanced shareholder rights and better shareholder representation can 
also pave the way for more bank board quality and more effective monitoring. Fourth, the 
quality of bank monitoring may increase if supervisory board members dispose of market 
signals indicative of bank risk. This calls for stock market quotation of bank equity as well as 
exchange trading of marketable bank assets. We note that more information from market 
prices under enhanced bank transparency can also improve regulatory supervision. Fifth, it 
seems worth exploring whether prudential bank regulations should explicitly encompass 
criteria for board competence and quality. These measures offer a promising path towards 
more financial stability because at the heart of any financial crisis are large bank losses.  
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Table 1: Capital Injections to State-Owned Banks (Landesbanken) from 1991 to 2005 
 
State-Owned Bank   Capital Injections (in € millions)
 
Bayern LB  660
Hamburgische LB  90
Helaba  406
HSH Nordbank  400
LB Berlin  2,560
LB Kiel  432
Norddeutsche LB  472
West LB  3,729
Total  8,749
 
Source: IMF (2006, 91) 
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Deutsche Bank  hv/mv  0  2005.5  36.07  25.9 8.45  55.6  0.42 23.43
Commerzbank mv  0  615.8  15.77  6.90 2.95  39.1  0.48 18.70
Dresdner Bank  mv  0  489.4  11.36  11.85 3.40  43.1  0.69 29.93
LBBW hv/mv  1  471.9  21.35  11.55 3.27  22.1  0.68 15.07
HVB Group  mv  0  435.7  23.90  11.55 1.16  18.2  0.27 4.87
DZ Bank  hv/mv  0 (co)  430.6  10.55  9.35 2.30  40.8  0.53 21.77
Bayern LB  hv/mv  1  415.6  12.22  6.40 5.81  34.0  1.16 39.40
Hypo Real Estate 
d mv  0  397.8  7.95  5.90 1.41  50.0  0.35 17.74
KfW Group  hv/mv  1  361.0  14.94  9.64 3.77  24.2  0.94 22.76
WestLB hv/mv  1  277.2  4.80  6.50 4.04  57.8  1.15 66.13
Nord LB   hv/mv  1  220.2  6.13  6.60 0.92  35.9  0.42 15.07
Postbank   mv  0  215.8  4.79  5.10 1.15  45.1  0.53 23.97
Eurohypo   hv/mv  0  207.1  5.28  5.15 0.39  39.2  0.19 7.40
HSH Nordbank   mv  1  204.6  4.44  7.55 2.60  46.0  1.13 52.00
Helaba hv/mv  1  174.2  4.86  4.90 0.69  35.9  0.3 10.79
NRW Bank  hv  1  145.4  19.58  3.10 ---  7.4  --- ---
Landesbank Berlin  hv/mv  1  144.4  2.55  3.85 1.41  56.7  0.72 41.05
Dekabank hv/mv  1  121.8  3.32  2.10 0.58  36.6  0.40 14.47
WGZ Bank AG   hv/mv  0 (co)  90.0  2.83  2.20 0.25  31.8  0.28 8.86
Essenhyp   hv  0  89.9  0.72  0.80 ---  124.6  --- ---
DG-Hypothekenbank hv  0  (co)  80.5  1.92  1.40 0.16  41.9  0.20 8.44
LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz  hv/mv  1  77.9  0.99  2.10 0.30  79.0  0.38 30.40
Sachsen LB  hv  1  62.1  1.42  1.30 1.80  43.8  2.90 127.03
Depfa Deutsche Pfandbrief Bank AG  hv 0  53.6  0.82 0.84 ---  65.2  --- ---
IKB hv/mv  1
c 50.2  1.18  2.15 5.13 42.4  10.22 433.53
Dexia Deutschland AG  hv  0  48.3  0.29  0.28 0.02  164.7  0.04 5.8
Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG  hv 0  42.5  0.72 0.64 0.06  58.8  0.14 8.04
WL Bank AG   hv  0 (co)  41.0  0.32  0.51 ---  126.5  --- ---
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA   hv/mv  0  40.1  2.00  1.80 0.57  20.0  1.41 28.19
Average Overall     276.2  7.69  5.44 2.10  51.3  1.04 42.99
Av. Private Banks     330.2  7.83  5.64 1.71  60.3  0.43 15.9
Av. State-Owned B.     209.7  7.52  5.20 2.52  40.1  1.70 72.3
Spearman Rank Test     0.865  0.493 0.453 0.117  0.209  0.009 0.009
            
  Notes: 
a  We distinguish historical value accounting (hv) and market value accounting (mv). Historical value 
accounting follows the German GAAP (HGB). Market value based accounting standards include US-GAAP, IFRS, 
IAS. Several banks have changed their accounting standards in the period under consideration (hv/mv). 
b Cooperative 
banks are labelled “(co)” in column (2).
 c In January 2008, IKB was formally a private bank but the state-owned bank 
KfW was the largest shareholder. 
d Additional goodwill losses of the HRE in 2008 were related to the M&A activities 
(Depfa) and were excluded from the data set as we focus on operating profits and losses.     30 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Reported are summary statistics for (the log of) total assets, leverage (as the ratio of total 
assets to book equity) and tier 1 capital averaged in each case over 2006 and 2007. Losses 
include the operating profits for the 7 quarters from 2007/1 to 2008/3 and all public 
announcements of losses until the end of 2008. Biographical information on 593 supervisory 
board members is aggregated into 4 measures of supervisory board competence, namely the 
educational index (AIE), the average management experience (AIM), the average finance 
experience (AIF) and the aggregate total experience measure (AIT). Operating performance 
measures for the period 1998-2006 are taken from Bankscope. Per capita profits refer to 
operating profits per employee in each year. Executive pay represents the average annual 
salary in 2006 of the executive board members. 
 
        
 Obs.  Mean  Min  Max  Median  Std.  Dev. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
           
Bank Variables:           
Dummy (State-Owned = 1)  29  0.448  0  0  1  0.506
Log of Total Assets  29  5.101  3.691  7.604  5.160  0.996
Log of Leverage  29  3.760  2.005  5.104  3.748  0.611
Log of Tier 1 Capital  29  1.552  0.247  3.292  1.677  0.767
Log of Loss/Assets  25  0.011  0.000  0.097  0.005  0.019
Log of Loss  25  0.933  0.017  2.246  0.878  0.634
            
Board Variables: 
AIE 29  0.223  0  0.593  0.201  0.158
AIM  29 0.562 0.095 1.386 0.511  0.322
AIF 29  0.511  0  1.504  0.405  0.428
AIT  29 0.953 0.182 2.058 0.871  0.506
Political Affiliations  29  0.182  0  0.722  0.125  0.209
            
Operating Performance Measures: 
Return on Book Assets   266  0.002  -0.017  0.021  0.002  0.004
Return on Book Equity  266  0.069  -2.715  0.737  0.096  0.219
Per Capita Profits  266  0.131  -1.993  4.637  0.078  0.429
       
Executive Board Variable:       
Log of Excecutive Pay  26 0.735 0.231  2.121  0.620  0.383
          
Source: Authors’ calculation    31 
Table 4: Bank Losses of Private and State-Owned Banks in the Financial Crisis 
Reported are OLS regressions for the (log of the) bank losses in the period 2007-2008 for 25 
German banks. Specification (1) uses the bank losses normalized by total assets as the 
dependent variable, while specifications (2) to (5) use absolute bank losses (in logs) as the 
dependent variable. The regressions controls are bank size measured by the log of total assets, 
log of tier 1 capital and leverage defined as the log ratio of total assets over bank equity capital 
at book value. The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark statistical 
significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level (**) and 3 percent level (***). 
 
    
    Dependent Variables 
    Log(Loss/ 
Total Assets)   log(Loss)  log(Loss)  log(Loss)  log(Loss) 
Independent Variables    (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
              
Constant   -5.768*** -6.176*** -2.612 -1.988***  -1.504
   [-22.34] [-5.74] [-1.25] [-6.57]  [-0.88]
Dummy (State-Owned =1)    1.194*** 1.208*** 1.146*** 0.845***  0.842***
   [3.20] [3.17] [3.18] [2.68]  [2.61]
Log of Total Assets    1.077*** 0.983***  
   [5.36] [5.16]  
Log of Leverage    -0.817*   -0.120
   [-1.95]   [-0.29]
Log of Tier 1 Capital    1.157***  1.132***
   [7.36]  [6.17]
    
Obs.     25 25 25 25  25
Adj. R
2   0.279 0.596 0.641 0.723  0.711
    
Source: Authors’ calculation    32 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Competencies in Supervisory Boards  
 
         
     Board Members of Private Banks  Board Members of State Banks  Fisher- /Spearman-Tests  






     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
     Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  H0 : (2)  
= (8)  
H0 : (4) 
= (10) 
 H0 : (6) 
= (12) 
  Biographical Data                                              
A1  Age  103  57.73 86 59.13 17 50.88 186  56.20 177 56.09 9 58.22 0.132 0.005  0.010 
A2  Foreign Nationality  215  0.047 139 0.072 76 0.0 378  0.005 268 0.007 110 0.0 0.001 0.001  --- 
A3  Politically Connected 
Board Members  215  0.037 139 0.058 76 0.0 378  0.352 268 0.481 110 0.036 0.000 0.000  0.120 
  Education             
E1  Business/Econ Degree  215  0.191 139 0.273 76 0.039 378  0.148 268 0.201 110 0.018 0.110 0.065  0.331 
E2  MBA  215  0.037 139 0.058 76 0.0 378  0.005 268 0.007 110 0.0 0.006 0.004  --- 
E3  PhD  215  0.112 139 0.173 76 0.0 378  0.053 268 0.075 110 0.0 0.008 0.003  --- 
  Finance Experience         
F1  Banking Experience  215  0.316 139 0.367 76 0.224 378  0.111 268 0.142 110 0.036 0.000 0.000  0.000 
F2  Financial Market 
Experience  215  0.270 139 0.367 76 0.092 378  0.071 268 0.101 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  0.002 
F3  … since 1990  215  0.270 139 0.367 76 0.092 378  0.069 268 0.097 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  0.002 
F4  … in the Same Bank  215  0.102 139 0.108 76 0.092 378  0.003 268 0.004 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  0.002 
F5  US Financial Market 
Experience  215  0.181 139 0.209 76 0.132 378  0.019 268 0.026 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  0.000 
F6  … since 1990  215  0.060 139 0.094 76 0.0 378  0.016 268 0.022 110 0.0 0.004 0.002  --- 
  Management Experience         
M1  Consulting Experience  215  0.056 139 0.079 76 0.013 378  0.026 268 0.037 110 0.0 0.058 0.061  0.409 
M2  Mid-level Management  215  0.358 139 0.532 76 0.039 378  0.0167 268 0.231 110 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.187 
M3  Top-level Management 
Finance  215  0.237 139 0.338 76 0.053 378  0.085 268 0.119 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  0.027 
M4  … in the Same Bank  215  0.060 139 0.094 76 0.0 378  0.003 268 0.004 110 0.0 0.000 0.000  --- 
M5  Multiple Board 
Memberships  215  0.298 139 0.417 76 0.079 378  0.225 268 0.310 110 0.018 0.032 0.020  0.051 
  Competence Indices             
IE  Education (SUM)  215  0.340 139 0.504 76 0.039 378  0.206 268 0.284 110 0.018 0.117 0.041  0.380 
IF  Finance Exp. (SUM)  215  1.200 139 1.511 76 0.632 378  0.288 268 0.392 110 0.036 0.000 0.000  0.000 
IM  Mgmt Experience (SUM)  215  1.009 139 1.460 76 0.184 378  0.505 268 0.701 110 0.027 0.000 0.000  0.002 
IT  Total (SUM)  215  2.549 139 3.475 76 0.855 378  1.000 268 1.377 110 0.082 0.000 0.000  0.000 
              33 
Table 6: Competencies of Politically Connected Members in Supervisory Boards  
 
       
Board Members of Private and State Banks   
   
All Members  Politically 
Connected 
Members. 
Other Members  Fisher-
/Spearman-
Test 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
     Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  H0 : (4) = (6) 
  Biographical Data                     
A1  Age  263 57.07 136 56.04 127 58.18 0.072
A2  Foreign Nationality  407 0.029 137 0.000 270 0.044 0.007
  Education       
E1  Business/Econ Degree  407 0.226 137 0.241 270 0.219 0.348
E2  MBA  407 0.025 137 0.022 270 0.026 0.550
E3  PhD  407 0.101 137 0.066 270 0.119 0.064
  Finance Experience       
F1  Banking Experience  407 0.219 137 0.088 270 0.285 0.000
F2  Financial Market Experience  407 0.192 137 0.029 270 0.274 0.000
F3  … since 1990  407 0.189 137 0.029 270 0.270 0.000
F4  … in the Same Bank  407 0.039 137 0.007 270 0.056 0.012
F5  US Financial Market Experience  407 0.081 137 0.000 270 0.122 0.000
F6  … since 1990  407 0.047 137 0.000 270 0.070 0.000
  Management Experience 
M1  Consulting Experience  407 0.052 137 0.066 270 0.044 0.245
M2  Mid-level Management  407 0.334 137 0.190 270 0.407 0.000
M3  Toplevel Management Finance  407 0.194 137 0.088 270 0.248 0.000
M4  … in the Same Bank  407 0.034 137 0.007 270 0.048 0.024
M5  Multiple Board Memberships  407 0.346 137 0.380 270 0.330 0.186
  Competence Indices       
IE  Education (SUM)  407 0.351 137 0.328 270 0.363 0.884
IF  Finance Experience (SUM)  407 0.767 137 0.153 270 1.078 0.000
IM  Mgmt Experience (SUM)  407 0.961 137 0.730 270 1.078 0.174
IT  Total (SUM)  407 2.079 137 1.212 270 2.519 0.109
     
Source: Authors’ calculation   34 
 
Table 7: Relative Bank Losses and Supervisory Board Competence 
Reported are OLS regressions for the (log of the) bank losses in the period 2007-2008 relative 
to total assets (at the end of 2007) for 25 German banks. As the independent variable we use 4 
measures of supervisory board competence, namely the educational index (AIE), the average 
management experience (AIM), the average finance experience (AIF) and the aggregate total 
experience measure (AIT). The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level (**) and the 3 percent 
level (***). 
 
   Dependent Variable: log(Loss/Total Assets) 
Independent Variables   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
    
Constant   -5.479*** -4.866*** -4.677***  -4.66***
   [-13.89] [-10.84] [-15.33]  [-10.35]
Education (AIE)    1.294  
   [0.87]  
Mgmt. Experience (AIM)    -0.588  
   [-0.84]  
Finance Experience (AIF)    -1.083** 
   [-2.27] 
Total Experience (AIT)      -0.577
     [-1.35]
    
Obs.     25 25 25  25
Adj. R-squared    0.000 0.000 0.147  0.033
    
Source: Authors’ calculation   35 
Table 8: Absolute Bank Losses with Size Controls 
Reported are OLS regressions for the (log of the) bank losses in the period 2007-2008 for 25 German banks. As the independent variable we use 4 
measures of supervisory board competence, namely the educational index (AIE), the average management experience (AIM), the average finance 
experience (AIF) and the aggregate total experience measure (AIT). Each regression controls for the bank size by using either (the log of) the total 
bank assets or (the log of) tier 1 capital. The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level (*), the 5 percent level (**) and the 3 percent level (***). 
 
      
   Dependent Variable: log(Loss) 
Independent Variables    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
            
Constant   -5.193*** -5.  296*** -5.606*** -5.262*** -1.687*** -1.351*** -1.301*** -1.220*** 
   [-4.20] [-4.37] [-5.00] [-4.39] [-4.70] [-3.40] [-4.09] [-3.06] 
Education (AIE)    1.439 0.462  
   [0.88] [0.35]  
Mgmt. Experience (AIM)    -0.682 -0.621  
   [-0.90] [-1.07]  
Finance Experience (AIF)    -1.224*** -0.867**  
   [-2.41] [-2.21]  
Total Experience (AIT)    -0.658 -0.532 
   [-1.43] [-1.52] 
Log of Total Assets    0.924*** 1.072*** 1.190*** 1.136***  
   [3.81] [4.44] [5.39] [4.71]  
Log of Tier 1 Capital    1.136*** 1.240*** 1.252*** 1.160*** 
   [5.86] [6.79] [7.55] [5.87] 
    
Obs.     25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adj. R-squared    0.432 0.433 0.535 0.462 0.634 0.651 0.699 0.667 
    
Source: Authors’ calculation    36 
Table 9: IV Regressions for Absolute Bank Losses with Size Controls 
Reported are instrumental variable (IV) regressions for the (log of the) bank losses in the period 2007-2008 for 25 German banks. As the 
independent variable we use 4 measures of supervisory board competence, namely the educational index (AIE), the average management experience 
(AIM), the average finance experience (AIF) and the aggregate total experience measure (AIT). As instruments for board competence we use a 
dummy variable for state-owned banks and the percentage of politically appointed board members. Each regression controls for the bank size by 
using either (the log of) the total bank assets or (the log of) tier 1 capital. The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level (**) and the 3 percent level (***). 
      
   Dependent Variable: log(Loss) 
Independent Variables    (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Constant   -6.232** -5.306*** -5.910*** -5.191*** -0.077 -0.325 -0.924** -0.320 
   [-2.14] [-3.31] [-4.63] [-3.54] [-0.05] [-0.39] [-2.05] [-0.42] 
Education (AIE)    -13.485 -11.510  
   [-0.85] [-1.06]  
Mgmt. Experience (AIM)    -3.649 -2.950  
   [-1.62] [-1.75]  
Finance Experience (AIF)    -2.415** -1.879**  
   [-2.23] [-2.22]  
Total Experience (AIT)    -2.177* -1.717* 
   [-1.84] [-1.94] 
Log of Total Assets    1.763* 1.410*** 1.357*** 1.383***  
   [1.74] [3.65] [4.87] [4.08]  
Log of Tier 1 Capital    1.885*** 1.437*** 1.327*** 1.389*** 
   [2.46] [5.29] [6.75] [5.89] 
    
Obs.     25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adj. R-squared    0.000 0.035 0.418 0.194 0.000 0.395 0.608 0.495 
F statistics (of first stage)    1.49 2.71 3.78 3.10 2.05 2.50 3.04 2.73 
       37 
Table 10: Operating Performance prior to the Crisis  
Reported are panel regressions for three measures of operating performance over the period 1998-2006. Return on book assets is defined as the ratio 
of annual operating profits before taxes and a bank's book assets, return on book equity is calculate as the ratio of annual operating profits before 
taxes and book equity, and per capita profit measures annual operating profits (in m. €) relative to the number of bank employees. The explanatory 
variables are a dummy coded 1 for private banks and 0 for state banks, the average finance experience (AIF) measure of the supervisory board and 
its aggregate total experience measure (AIT). The regressions allow for random effects for each year and each bank. Fixed time effects yield similar 
results. The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark statistical significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level (**) 
and the 3 percent level (***). 
      
    Dependent Variables 
    Return on Book Assets    Return on Book Equity    Per Capita Profits (m. €) 
Independent Variables    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) (6)    (7)  (8) (9) 
                       
Constant   0.241*** 0.235*** 0.167* 7.985***  5.267** 3.375 0.202*** 0.007 -0.017 
   [4.09] [3.20] [1.85] [3.69]  [1.98] [1.04] [3.16] [0.10] [-0.17] 
      
Dummy (State-Owned = 1)    -0.087 -2.152  -0.163  
   [-0.94] [-0.64]  [-1.64]  
Finance Experience (AIF)    -0.098   6.168 0.423**  
   [-0.51]   [0.88] [2.14]  
Total Experience (AIT)    0.115   11.443 0.461* 
   [0.55]   [1.32] [1.83] 
      
Number of Banks    29 29 29 29  29 29 29 29 29 
Obs.     266 266 266 266  266 266 260 260 266 
     0.365 0.374 0.376 0.069 0.069 0.065 0.316 0.299 0.310 
Overall R
2   0.011 0.009 0.001 0.002  0.004 0.010 0.032 0.053 0.038 
                       
Source: Authors’ calculation    38 
Table 11: Determinants of Executive Pay  
The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the log of the average compensation of 25 German bank executive boards in 2006. The 
explanatory variables are a dummy coded 1 for private banks and 0 for state banks, the percentage of politically appointed supervisory board 
members (Political Affiliations), the average finance experience (AIF) measure of the supervisory board and its aggregate total experience measure 
(AIT). The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark statistical significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level (**) 
and the 3 percent level (***). 
   
    Dependent Variable: Log of Executive Pay 
Independent Variables    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Constant   -0.796*** -0.767*** -0.901*** -0.947***
   [-2.20] [-2.40] [-2.58] [-2.93]
Log of Total Assets    0.300*** 0.308*** 0.300*** 0.291***
   [4.57] [5.19] [4.56] [4.47]
  
Dummy (State Owned = 1)    -0.095
   [-0.77]
Political Affiliations    -0.612**
   [-2.33]
Finance Experience (AIF)    0.106
   [0.72]
Total Experience (AIT)    0.155
   [1.27]
  
Obs.     26 26 26 26
Adj. R
2   0.  452 0.546 0.450 0.475
  
Source: Authors’ calculation    39 
Table 12: Absolute Bank Losses and Executive Pay 
Reported are OLS regressions for the (log of the) bank losses in the period 2007-2008 for 25 German banks. As the independent variables we use 
the log of the average compensation of a bank's management board member, as well as supervisory board competence measures, namely its average 
finance experience (AIF) and the aggregate total experience measure (AIT). Each regression controls for the bank size by using (the log of) the total 
bank assets. The t-values of the coefficients are reported in brackets. We mark statistical significance at the 10 percent level (*), the 5 percent level 
(**) and the 3 percent level (***). 
    
    Dependent Variable: log(Loss)
Independent Variables    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Constant   -4.950*** -5.606***  -4.705*** -5.262*** -4.380
   [-3.35] [-5.00]  [-3.73] [-4.39] [-3.21]
    
Log of Executive Pay    0.833   1.229* 1.366*
   [1.09]   [1.84] [1.86]
Finance Experience (AIF)    -1.224***  -1.486***
   [-2.41]  [-2.91]
Total Experience (AIT)      -0.658 -1.084**
     [-1.43] [-2.29]
Log of Total Assets    0.831*** 1.190***  -0.871***  1.129*** 0.842***
   [2.49] [5.39]  [-3.06] [4.75] [2.78]
    
Obs.     23 25  23 25 23
Adj. R
2   0.440 0.535  0.593 0.462 0.538
    
Source: Authors’ calculation CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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